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A prominent body of literature indicates that insanity evaluations, which are intended to
provide influential expert reports for judges to reach a decision “beyond any reasonable
doubt,” suffer from a low inter-rater reliability. This paper reviews the limitations of
the classical approach to insanity evaluation and the criticisms to the introduction of
neuro-scientific approach in court. Here, we explain why in our opinion these criticisms,
that seriously hamper the translational implementation of neuroscience into the forensic
setting, do not survive scientific scrutiny. Moreover, we discuss how the neuro-scientific
multimodal approachmay improve the inter-rater reliability in insanity evaluation. Critically,
neuroscience does not aim to introduce a brain-based concept of insanity. Indeed,
criteria for responsibility and insanity are and should remain clinical. Rather, following the
falsificationist approach and the convergence of evidence principle, the neuro-scientific
multimodal approach is being proposed as a way to improve reliability of insanity
evaluation and to mitigate the influence of cognitive biases on the formulation of insanity
opinions, with the final aim to reduce errors and controversies.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent findings from neuroscience research challenge traditional approaches to different aspects
of forensic evaluations. The use of neuro-scientific evidence in criminal proceedings has increased
tremendously in the United States over the last two decades (1). Themost critical topic of discussion
regards the relevance of neuroscience in insanity evaluations. Most legal systems consider mental
insanity as reason tomitigate or exclude responsibility in the case of individuals affected by amental
illness that greatly reduced or abolished their capability for self-determination at the time of the
crime (2, 3).
The typical approach to mental insanity evaluation is based mostly only on unstructured
psychiatric interviews with the defendant. Though semi-structured interviews may also be utilized
in a mental insanity assessment, in some countries, including Italy, their use is often regarded as
superfluous by experienced clinicians. A limitation of both unstructured and structured interviews
is that they rely to a considerable extent on the defendant self-reports (3).
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A growing body of data suggests that criminal behavior has
a multifaceted neurobiological component, including genetic
and epigenetic factors as well as structural and functional
brain correlates (4–12). These novel pieces of knowledge
have intensified judicial interest in the potential application
of neuroscience to criminal law (13). The so-called “neuro-
scientific” approach aims to complement the classical approach
to mental insanity evaluation by providing objective indices
of possible brain function alterations. To this aim, the
neuro-scientific approach requires that multiple pieces of
evidence from different disciplines coherently converge to
support an hypothesis (14). Neuropsychological assessments
and reaction time based behavioral tasks are two examples
of methods that are considered to be neuro-scientific, as
they provide an objective evidence of brain functioning and
go beyond the patient’s self report. For this reason, the
neuro-scientific approach is considered to be trans-disciplinary
and multimodal. Furthermore, according with the neuro-
scientific approach, insanity evaluations in specific cases may
be integrated by instrumental analyses, including magnetic
resonance imaging (MRI), positron emission tomography (PET)
and other methods (15).
On one hand, neuroscientists believe that insanity assessments
should be enriched by adopting a multimodal trans-disciplinary
approach that provides an objective indirect evidence of how
the brain functions. Neuro-scientific techniques are thought to
increase the reliability of the evaluation (4, 16, 17) as they
are less prone to any (un)conscious exaggeration of symptoms
for defensive purposes as well as to human cognitive biases.
On the other hand, this approach has been heavily criticized
by other authors (18–21), who consider psychiatric interviews
sufficient to evaluate the defendant mental state. Neuroscientists
who support the use of a multimodal approach in criminal
trials do not deny that the legal criteria for insanity are, and
should remain, based on the evaluation of the individual behavior
(15, 22). However, they also sustain that the clinical evaluation,
based on unstructured interviews only, often leads to subjective
and inconclusive opinions on insanity. Furthermore, though
the results of insanity evaluations are intrinsically probabilistic
inferences, this covert diagnostic uncertainty is not translated
into a probabilistic decision (“The defendant is insane with
60% of probability”), but rather in a categorical one (sane,
partially insane, totally insane). These categories may vary across
different countries (23), further complicating the situation. In
criminal trials, judges and jurors should reach their decisions
in accordance with the “beyond any reasonable doubt” (BARD)
principle. Indeed, this principle was meant to prevent the
outcome of a trial from being influenced by subjectivity and
arbitrariness. Judge and juror decisions should be rational, clearly
justified and based on reliable scientific evidence. However, their
decisions are often influenced by the results of the insanity
evaluations which, in turn, are themselves disputable (24).
The aim of the neuro-scientific approach is not to change the
way insanity is defined, but rather to improve the reliability of
insanity assessments, mitigate the potential influence of cognitive
biases and reduce controversies in criminal cases. Thus, in cases
in which, using the typical approach to insanity, different experts
reach different conclusions, a multimodal trans-disciplinary
approach can provide objective data crucial to disentangle
whether or not objective measures of psychopathology are
present and clinically relevant. Furthermore, if different
independent pieces of evidence converge toward an opinion
on insanity, it would become very difficult to support the
opposite conclusion without falling into logical biases. In the
following sections, we will discuss the reasons that make the
classical approach to insanity defense biased by low inter-rater
reliability. We also will explain why we believe that criticisms
to the adoption of multimodal neuro-scientific methods to
complement insanity evaluation are not scientifically supported.
Finally, we will discuss how a multimodal trans-disciplinary
approach can improve insanity evaluation procedures.
THE INTRINSIC LOW RELIABILITY OF
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MENTAL
DISORDERS AND INSANITY
Psychiatric Evaluations Using
Unstructured Interviews Only Are
Characterized by a Low Inter-rater
Reliability
Insanity evaluation requires the assessment of psychiatric
conditions that can greatly diminish or completely abolish the
ability to understand and/or to freely will and to establish a causal
link between the abnormal mental condition and the criminal
act (23). The first part of this process is characterized by a low
inter-rater reliability even in the clinical setting. Reliability of
the diagnostic process in psychiatry is greatly challenged by the
absence of biomarkers (25, 26), that is, features that can be
objectively measured and are indicative of normal or pathological
processes (27). Second, the underlying brain pathology is not
evident at visual inspection of brain scans, but may only be
identified through complex analyses of brain imaging data (28).
Third, many psychopathological symptoms are common to
different disorders (29). For these reasons, the diagnostic criteria
are created on consensus and are therefore questionable. For
instance, one of the criteria for schizophrenia requires that “For a
significant portion of time since the onset of the disturbance, level of
functioning in one or more major areas (...) is markedly below the
level achieved prior to the onset”. It is not clear what “significant
portion of time” means. In the forensic setting, this leaves the
criterium open to different interpretations and controversies.
Thus, psychiatric assessments based on unstructured interviews
only suffer from low inter-rater reliability (30–32), even when
experienced psychiatrists are involved [for instance, in (31, 33)
raters have more than 20 years of clinical experience]. In other
words, different clinicians who examine the same patient are
likely to reach different diagnostic conclusions. That is what can
be observed on a daily basis not only in the clinical field, but
even more so in the forensic context. Inter-rater reliability is
measured by an index (kappa) that ranges from 0 to 1, where
0 refers to absence of agreement and 1 to complete agreement
among different raters. For instance, DSM-5 fields trial research
reported that the inter-rater agreement for schizophrenia was
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0.46, while the inter-rater agreement for major depression was
only 0.28 (32). Importantly, the same problem is also present in
forensic setting (34).
Insanity Evaluation Is Characterized by a
Low Inter-rater Reliability
Insanity evaluation requires to determine (1) whether the
defendant is affected by a psychiatric disorder; (2) whether and
to what extent that disorder also affects the defendant’s ability
to understand and/or to freely will; and (3) whether there is a
causal link between the mental condition and the criminal act.
A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of previous studies
that investigated inter-rater reliability of sanity opinions revealed
agreement rates ranging from 57 to 100% and kappas ranging
from 0.28 to 1.0 (24). The meta-analysis returned estimates of
0.41 (95% CI: 0.29–0.53) for sanity opinions. While this would be
considered relatively strong from a mere statistical point of view,
such a concordance rate is actually quite unsatisfactory when
applied to the legal context, in which judges are required to reach
decisions in compliance with the BARD principle.
The required evaluation of the existence of a causal link
between the diagnosed mental condition and the committed
criminal act may also be a factor of further discrepancy among
experts. Specifically, causal link means that the crime must
be an evident consequence of the underlying mental disorder:
for instance, a causal link may be proven if an individual
with a persecutory delusion hits a neighbor who the subject
was convinced was spying on him, but not if the same
individual steals a jacket from a store. The identification of
this causal link is subjected to arbitrariness as, in the disregard
of respect to accepted guidelines, some experts may detect a
causal link, whereas others may not. Recently, the European
Psychiatric Association (EPA) found that the evidence base for
forensic-psychiatric practice is weak and therefore has provided
recommendations for best practice (35). Moreover, the American
Academy of Psychiatry and Law (AAPL) has published guidelines
based on a comprehensive review of legal and psychiatric factors
to be taken into account to perform insanity defense evaluations
(Journal of AAPL, 2014). Finally, a recent work proposed an
insanity assessment support scale based on clinical criteria (36).
This instrument, however, still has to be validated. Overall,
the adherence to standardized guidelines to fulfill shared and
validated criteria to assess mental insanity remains to date
largely unsatisfactory.
A recent retrospective study on insanity evaluations found
that criminals judged as insane presented with more severe
psychiatric symptoms and had a higher number of psychiatric
treatments and involuntary hospitalizations as compared to those
who ended up to be considered not mentally insane (37). In
addition, time-bias (37) or crime-related (38) factors, more
than strictly mental state related factors, appear to influence
insanity opinions.
It should be emphasized that forensic psychiatric evaluation
is a decision-making process in which a clinical, naturalistic
element (the nosografic diagnosis) is unavoidably coupled with
a juridical element (the expert’s opinion on insanity). Insanity,
indeed, is not a natural data per se; as a matter of fact, the criteria
for insanity stated by the law, as well as other social factors,
may lead to completely different conclusions in the same case,
depending on the country where the evaluation is performed
(39). This makes the comparison of procedures and results
across different countries very difficult, further complicating the
scientific evaluation of the field.
Clinical Diagnosis Is Affected by Cognitive
Fallacies/Biases
As any human being, also forensic experts may be vulnerable
to cognitive fallacies. Cognitive fallacies are cognitive failures
that subconsciously influence the perception and evaluation
of evidence (40, 41). Cognitive fallacies are present event in
disciplines in which mistakes are supposed to be essentially
absent, including fingerprints and firearms analyses (41, 42) The
fascinating research on cognitive biases in forensic sciences is
rapidly expanding (40, 43–47), as well as their occurrence in
real cases (14, 16). The first and most important result from
these studies is the general lack of acceptance of the need
for procedures to minimize cognitive biases and a failure to
recognize susceptibility to biases (48), an effect that hereafter
will be called “denial cognitive bias.” A similar bias is called
“blind spot,” which refers to the tendency to recognize bias in
others while remaining oblivious to one’s own biases. Critically,
the denial cognitive biases and the blind spot are the lesser
acknowledged biases among forensic experts (49). Another
predominant cognitive bias emerging in criminal trials, as
revealed by a systematic review (43) and a survey (40), is the
confirmation bias, consisting in the tendency to search for, agree
with or interpret information in a way that confirms one’s own
presumptions (47). This cognitive bias is present in the great
majority of criminal trials (16, 40, 42, 43, 50). In addition, forensic
science is also affected by the adversarial allegiance effect, that
is, the tendency to find pieces of evidence supporting the side
that retains the expert (43, 51). Despite some legal systems, such
as the Italian one, attempted to overcome this limitation by
including a super-partes expert summoned by the judge (Peritus),
this strategy alone is not sufficient tomitigate biases, as the Peritus
also is subjected to subconscious biases, such as prejudice, denial
bias, confirmatory bias and so on and so forth.
Intriguingly, cognitive biases can affect the observation of
evidence, that is, the clinician’s ability to detect psychiatric
symptoms as well as the conclusions, defined as the cognitive
interpretations of observations, that is, the psychiatric diagnosis
(14, 44–46). As an example of bias at the level of the
observation, Table 1 reports the symptoms observed by three
different clinicians in a recent criminal case of a woman charged
for supposedly killing her own husband and with previous
documentation supporting the presence of chronic alcoholism
(which, in Italy, is a relevant factor for insanity evaluation):
three clinicians observed three different psychiatric symptom
constellations Importantly, because he did not notice any signs
or symptoms of chronic alcoholism, the Peritus denied additional
investigations (neuropsychological test and an MRI) to verify
the potential presence of neurological damages due to chronic
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This is a representative case of a woman prosecuted for killing her husband and evaluated
by a court appointed expert (Peritus) and experts from the two adversarial sides.
alcoholism and eventually he concluded for the woman to be
mentally sane.
Furthermore, a representative example of cognitive bias in
inter-rater reliability emerging at the level of the conclusions
pertains to the famous Breivik case, in which different clinicians
who observed the same symptoms reached very different
diagnostic conclusions: specifically, narcissistic personality
disorder combined with pseudologia fantastica as opposed
to paranoid schizophrenia, obviously with major different
implications for insanity (52). Another example of bias at the
level of the conclusions was described in a recent paper, where
self-reported information from the defendant were considered,
respectively, either indicative of psychiatric symptoms or
deprived of any significant meaning by different consultants (53).
The Identification of Malingering Using
Clinical Interview Only Is Very Challenging
An additional factor that makes forensic psychiatric evaluations
extremely challenging is that defendants may intentionally
malinger or exaggerate symptoms for defensive purposes
(54). The malingering assessment is undoubtedly of primary
importance in forensic settings. Nevertheless, some clinicians
may perform this assessment inappropriately due to the so
called Dunning-Kruger effect, a cognitive bias consisting in
overestimating one’s own competence in a specific topic (55).
In contrast, scientific research indicates that experienced
individuals, including judges, psychiatrists and forensic
consultants, in detecting deception perform only slightly better
than chance (56). In general, professional lie catchers exhibit
accuracy rates in the range from 45 to 60%, with a mean of
54% (57, 58). In this regard, results from two well-known
studies prompt important considerations. In a 1973 study (59),
“pseudo patients” feigning hallucinations were all admitted to
the psychiatric department of twelve different highly specialized
hospitals: all but one (who was diagnosed with bipolar disorder)
received a clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia. It is relevant to
highlight that this study was performed in 1973, thus prior to the
adoption of the more stringent diagnostic criteria included in
the most recent versions of the DSM. While these results should
be considered with caution, their broader meaning appears to
be still valid. Indeed, in a more recent study (60), experienced
psychiatrists distinguished actors from real depressed patients
during a clinical interview with an accuracy close to the chance
level. Furthermore, the clinicians rated their confidence in their
diagnoses as 6.5 out of 10 in the case of patients and 7.1 in
the case of actors, showing that they were equally certain in
either case. Because clinical interviews cannot be used to reliably
detect malingerers, researchers have developed tests that can
support clinicians to detect malingering of cognitive (61, 62) and
psychiatric disorders (63–65). These cognitive tests have a high
accuracy rate. For instance, a mouse tracking and a reaction time
cognitive test achieved an accuracy up to 96% in distinguishing
liars (malingering psychiatric symptoms) from truly depressed
patients and truth-tellers (65).
To conclude, the challenge psychiatry faces may turn into
vulnerability in the court of law (3). Indeed, a prominent body
of literature suggests that using the classical approach, the
outcome of the insanity evaluation, which is taken into account
by judges to reach a decision “beyond any reasonable doubt,” is
characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Thus, any innovation
that can improve its reliability, though imperfect, should be
welcomed. Unfortunately, criticisms of the multi-disciplinary
approach often neglect the intrinsic unreliability of this discipline
and how the results of insanity evaluations can be affected by
unconscious logical/cognitive fallacies. To deny these problems
is a cognitive bias per se (40, 48).
CRITICISMS TO THE NEURO-SCIENTIFIC
APPROACH: ARE THEY SCIENTIFICALLY
GROUNDED? IF NOT, WHY?
In order to mitigate the effects of subjective variability in
insanity assessment, some forensic experts welcomed the use
of the neuro-scientific multimodal methodology in court.
Indeed, this approach allows to support the preliminary clinical
diagnosis made through unstructured interviews with the
results from semi-structured interviews; to support the clinical
opinions on self-determination ability by using standardized
neuropsychological tests; to unveil the presence of malingering
by using reaction-time based instruments; to corroborate the
genesis and the dynamic of the criminal act with neuroimaging
and neurobiological data. At the same time, the introduction
of this approach in the forensic context has been highly
criticized by other scholars. In the following paragraphs, we
will take into consideration the main criticisms that have been
raised against the neuro-scientific approach. We will explain
also why we believe that these criticisms lack of a scientific
basis. Indeed, in our opinion they lay on wrong assumptions
or are not supported by the most recent and authoritative
literature. The subheadings of the following paragraphs reflect
the main criticisms.
Neuroscientists Believe That
Neuro-Scientific Methods (in Particular
Neuroimaging) Alone Are Enough to
Determine Insanity
“The most pernicious error here, one that is not easy to spot, is
the claim that because the amygdala is the fear center, activity
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there indicates that the defendant was experiencing high levels
of fear” (66). Authors who express this kind of criticisms
assume that neuroscientists who promote the application of
neuroscience methods in the forensic context, believe that neuro-
scientific methods, and in particular neuroimaging, can be used
in isolation (i.e., independently from the presence of any clinical
symptoms) to claim insanity. In other words, the worry is
that neuroscientists intend to replace the clinical assessment
of insanity with neuroscience and neuroimaging methods. This
criticism is based on a misinterpretation of the neuroscience
position, a logical bias called “strawman fallacy.” Indeed, it
provides a distorted version of the neuroscientist opinion, as
neuroscientists are not claiming that brain imaging (or any
other laboratory test) alone is sufficient nor that it should
replace clinical interviews; rather, neuroscientists sustain that
criteria for responsibility are and should remain based on
clinical factors (22) and that brain scan exams may provide
an objective support to the clinical diagnosis (15). Of note,
a brain abnormality per se is not necessarily sufficient for
determining insanity (15). For instance, the Italian serial killer
Gianfranco Stevanin, despite a macroscopic traumatic lesion in
the frontal lobe, was considered criminally liable because his
ability to do otherwise was spared (15). Claiming that applying
neuroimaging to insanity evaluation lacks of incremental validity
above and beyond extant information (18, 21, 67) is simply
untrue, as neurobiological evidence does contribute to solve
diagnostic disputes and to obtain a more reliable diagnostic
profile (68). As recently demonstrated, neuroimaging has indeed
the potential to delineate also distinct and highly reproducible
neuroanatomical subtypes within the same pathology (69). Thus,
the incremental value of neuroscience lays in its usefulness to
reduce the degree of intrinsic variability in insanity assessments
(70). Of course, the relevance of neuro-scientific results in
evaluating insanity may vary from case to case depending on
individual features (71). Finally, any determinism should be
strictly avoided (15).
Neuroscientists Want to Infer Insanity
From Brain Structure/Activation
“A structural MRI reveals a brain defect in the frontal lobe,
which is then used to justify the assertion that because of the
defect, the person has impaired impulse control or impaired
rationality” (66). Similarly, “Neuroimaging experts often posit
direct connections between brain data and criminal actions,
arguing that such connections form the foundation for an insanity
defense” (21). The above statements are two representative
examples from recent literature of a major misconception
of the utilization of neuro-scientific methods. As a matter
of fact, neuroscientists are aware that brain imaging data
cannot prove any direct causal connection between brain
structure/function and criminal behavior. Indeed, we recently
remarked that “anatomo-clinical correlations can be assessed
between brain region and cognitive functions but cannot
be assessed between a brain region and criminal behavior,
as there is no specific brain region involved in complex
behaviors such as criminal violence” (15). In other words,
the anatomo-functional correlation should be assessed between
neuroimaging data and neuropsychological test results for
cognitive or behavioral functions that are relevant to comprehend
the criminal act, such as impulse (dis)-control or (deficits
in) moral reasoning. Furthermore, the causal link between
behavioral alterations and the committed crime is another
fundamental step in the evaluation of insanity (36). Thus,
this criticism is affected by the “strawman” cognitive fallacy
and violates each one of the four rules stated in recent peer-
reviewed indications regarding the utilization of neuroimaging in
court (15).
Neuroscientific Techniques Do Not Comply
With the Daubert Criteria
“Many scientists have debated the relevance and admissibility of
neuroimaging data to the insanity defense” (21). In our view,
this kind of criticism is too general and vague. For instance, it
is not clear if it refers to structural or functional neuroimaging
data. In addition, there are techniques that clearly comply
with the Daubert criteria: one example is the MRI structural
technique called Voxel Based Morphometry (VBM), which is
used to analyze the structure of the brain in order to detect
subtle brain changes that are not visible at gross inspection (72–
74). These techniques, whose error rate is known both at the
level of group and single individual analyses (75–77) and are
fully accepted by the scientific community, unfortunately are
sharply criticized when applied to the forensic field. Importantly,
these criticisms are not directed to the techniques per se, but to
the ways these techniques are believed to be utilized and their
results to be interpreted. For instance, critical authors believe
that VBM would be applied to find the neural basis of insanity
and that any detected abnormality would be used to sustain
insanity, regardless of the presence of clinical symptoms. On
the contrary, neuroscientists clearly stated that VBM can only
detect subtle brain abnormalities and that every inferences made
on insanity is the result of a deductive reasoning based on
stringent anatomo-clinical correlations (between the symptoms
presented by the defendant and the anatomical localization
of the abnormal brain region) and on the convergence of
evidence, that of course are independent steps from VBM
itself (15).
The Study of the Brain Is Useless for
Insanity Purposes as the Brain Is Dynamic
in Nature
“There is the problem of time: because people do not walk around
wearing scanners, neuroimaging evidence presents information
regarding brain structure or function after the fact” (66). The
above statement synthetizes the concern that brain imaging
examinations are performed sometimes months, if not years,
after the criminal facts have occurred. Although in most cases
insanity assessments do take place a long time after the criminal
acts, there are several aspects that need to be considered. In the
first place, the time lag between the facts and the examination
of the defendant applies to any component of the insanity
assessment, including the psychiatric examination. As a matter
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of fact, psychiatric symptoms may rapidly change over time,
both as a spontaneous evolution of the disorder and/or because
of the treatments that are administered to the subject (78–
80). Thus, establishing months later the “state of mind” of
an individual at the time of the facts is typically an exercise
based on assumptions and the evaluation of indirect pieces
of evidence. Second, while it is undeniable that the brain is
plastic, clinically relevant brain structural changes are obtained
with exercise or rehabilitation, aging, drug or alcohol abuse
or pathological processes (81–84). It is highly unlikely, if not
impossible, that an individual’s brain may undergo clinically
significant modifications over a few months just because of the
elapsed time, in the absence of any intervening brain accident
or insult (e.g., infarct, head trauma, tumor). To clarify this
issue with an example: let us assume that a MRI scan exam,
for instance, shows a significantly smaller gray matter volume
in the orbito-frontal regions, known to play a crucial role in
impulse and behavioral control, in an individual who committed
an impetus crime as compared to gender- and age-matched
controls. That difference is real and it is irrelevant that the
MRI scan had been performed a year after the facts, unless, of
course, the subject in the meantime had suffered an accident
that could have resulted in a loss of volume (e.g., severe head
trauma, vascular events, resection of a tumor). Obviously, such
a major event would be documented, especially given that the
defendant would have been in custody since the very first days
after the facts. An identical reasoning applies to functional brain
data. Though certainly more susceptible to variability over time
than structural data, measures of brain functional activation in
response to specific tasks remain relatively stable within the same
individual over time, unless there have been other interfering
factors, such as assumption of psychotropic medications or
illicit drugs, or pathologic events as mentioned above (85, 86).
Thus, a brain anatomical alteration or a dysfunctional response
in regions or circuits that modulate behavioral responses or
cognitive functions relevant for insanity assessments, may be a
valid element even if collected at distance of time after the facts.
However, as stressful life events may affect brain morphology (87,
88), prolonged incarcerations theoretically could be associated
with brain structural and functional changes. To what extent
such changes may affect cortical regions that are crucial for self-
determination and are therefore relevant in insanity assessments
remains to be established.
On the other hand, the elapsed time may play a different
role in the case that the brain lesion present at the time
of the criminal act had been removed or repaired when the
individual undergoes the insanity assessment. For instance, in a
published case of acquired pedophilia, pedophilia emerged as a
symptom of a clivus chordoma, a tumor of the notochord (89).
While the defense consultants had the opportunity to examine
the defendant prior to the surgical removal of the tumor, the
Periti did not. Thus, they could not appreciate the variety of
symptoms and signs that the consultants had detected at the
time of the first examination. Eventually, the Periti concluded
that the defendant was not insane at the time of the crime
[for a discussion about the insanity assessment of this case, see
also (16)].
The Study of the Brain Is Problematic in
Insanity Evaluation as Brain Images Should
Be Interpreted
“A functional or anatomical anomaly is interpreted as being
a handicap only insofar as the behavior it may produce is
considered such” (18). We do agree that while results from
neuro-scientific techniques (neuroimaging in particular) may
inform on the biological basis for insanity, they cannot be
themselves considered a proof of disability. This is necessary to
avoid determinism. Neuro-scientific results should be interpreted
taking into consideration the behavioral constellation of
symptoms manifested by the defendant, with the advantage that
neuro-scientific results cannot be malingered, unlike behaviors.
For instance, a lesion in the frontal lobe can be the cause of a
dis-inhibited and depraved sexual behavior conferring the base
for insanity [see case 1 described in (15)], while a very similar
lesion in the frontal lobe can be present in a defendant charged
for murder during extreme sexual acts and feigning frontal-lobe
induced dis-inhibition, thus leading to the decision of absence of
insanity [see case 2 described in (15)]. Neuro-scientific results,
including imaging data, may provide an objective contribution
to solve controversies on insanity among experts, as described
in a recent published paper (14). Unfortunately, clinical signs
and symptoms may be interpreted in different ways [for instance,
feigned or not feigned, hallucinations can be considered bizarre
or not bizarre, a defendant who believes to have the right to
decide who should die or live can be considered narcissistic or
psychotic (52), etc.] leading to cognitive biases at the level of
the conclusion of the Human Expert Performance model (45,
46) described in the first section of this paper. Neuroscientists
who support the usefulness of neuroimaging are well-aware
of its drawbacks and limitations: for this reason, we recently
proposed objective indications on how to interpret neuroimaging
results (15).
The Inference Group to Individual Cannot
Be Done
“Science generalized, population level knowledge of a phenomenon
does not necessarily provide an appropriate empirical foundation
for making inferences about the instantiation of that phenomenon
in any given individual” (67); “Virtually all brain scans rely on
group data to determine the presence or absence of irregularities.
The law, in contrast, typically relies on an idiographic approach,
whereby each case is decided on its unique merits and facts”
(21). The first weakness of this criticism is that it does not
distinguish between macroscopic and subtle brain alterations.
Indeed, when gross brain alterations, such as brain tumors,
traumatic injuries, advanced dementias, are considered, this
statement is completely unfounded. In all these cases, which
are the great majority, clinicians routinely make inferences at
the level of the single individual in everyday clinical practice
(i.e., when deciding whether to surgically remove the tumor,
whether or not include a patient in a clinical trial, etc).
Nevertheless, the use of neuroimaging has been criticized also
in these cases (90). A distinct consideration is required in the
case of subtle brain alterations, such as regional differences
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in neuronal density or fiber tracts, that can be detected only
by performing a statistical analysis between group of patients
and group of controls (91–94). Unlike neurological disorders,
which usually are accompanied by brain alterations that can be
easily revealed by routine laboratory exams, including tumors,
strokes, atrophy or inflammatory processes, psychiatric disorders
typically do not show gross morphological abnormalities.
However, specific psychopathological features may indeed be
associated with more subtle alterations in selected cortical or
subcortical structures, as well as in neural circuits, that are
devoted to emotional processing, modulation of aggressive
behavior or moral judgment (11, 95–99). As they regard psycho-
(patho)logical features, these abnormalities may very well be
trans-diagnostic (100–102) and consistent across different ethnic
groups (103). Though most of the above observations have been
provided by group comparisons, in recent years researchers
have aimed at enabling inferences to be made at the level
of the individual subject (104–108). Further, the error rate
of these single case analyses also were calculated in order
to fulfill the Daubert criteria (75, 76). In addition, guidelines
on how to correctly interpret these data were developed to
prevent erroneous conclusions (15). Noteworthy, the scientific
community is working to improve translation of neuroimaging
findings to the clinical settings through the implementation of
algorithms able to identify brain abnormalities in individual
patients. Indeed, eight tools already have been released freely
online to support clinical diagnoses [for a review see (53, 109)]:
clinicians can upload the MRI scans of an individual patient;
an automated and validated algorithm will analyze the brain
to detect potential structural alterations and a detailed report
will be generated and sent to the clinician. Finally, recent
advances have proposed a normative modeling in neuroimaging
analyses of psychiatric disorders (110, 111). According to this
approach, the degree to which each individual brain deviates
from the normative pattern is calculated so that these deviations
can be mapped in each individual and psychopathology can
be conceptualized as deviation from normative patterns (110–
113). In other words, the normative modeling provides a way
to quantify and characterize the manner in which the brain
of different individuals deviates from the expected normal
brain (110, 113). Authors clearly declared that this approach
cannot indicate directly whether the obtained deviations are
clinically relevant (110), and for this reason neuroimaging
results should assume clinical significance only when associated
with clinical symptoms. In summary, group to individual
inferences are possible even when structural abnormalities are
not grossly evident and are revealed by rigorous and sophisticated
statistical analyses.
Neuroimaging Are Useless as There Is no
Known Neural Basis for Insanity
“Large-scale normative imaging data on individuals found
insane have yet to be collected (. . . ) this means that data are
not sufficiently advanced to bear direct relevance to insanity
determination” (21). Insanity is not a specific syndrome or
disease that can be investigated as a unified entity, but rather
may derive from a variety of diseases with a different etiology.
For instance, insanity may be due to dementias, brain tumors,
psychoses, traumatic brain injuries. Of course, the brain regions
involved in these pathologies may widely differ, thus it is highly
unlikely to find a common neural substrate invariably shared by
individuals found to be insane. A further complication is that
insanity is a condition defined by the law, not amedical diagnosis.
Specifically, it is up to the judge to ultimately decide whether
or not the defendant is insane: such a decision not necessarily
reflects the expert conclusions nor, as discussed above, the experts
from the different sides may necessarily agree on the presence of
insanity in the first place. Thus, a search for the neural basis of
insanity as such would be affected by major conceptual caveats,
as the very same individual could be considered completely
insane by an expert and fully capable by another one. Rather,
a promising strategy in this direction is represented by the
search for the neural basis that may underlie abnormal/antisocial
behaviors in specific categories of offenders including rapists (97),
batterers (96, 114), or murderers (11, 98). Unfortunately, biased
by the logical fallacy called circular reasoning, the above studies
are criticized as well, as they are believed to look for a neural basis
of insanity (21).
Neuroimaging Data in the Absence of
Clinical Symptoms Have Been Used to
Sustain Forensic Conclusions
Criminal cases in which brain imaging was misused, such as
the notorious case of Weinstein, in which the defense attorneys
sustained a decreased culpability because of the presence of a
congenital arachnoid cyst, disregarding the essentially complete
lack of any psychiatric symptoms or behavioral abnormalities in
the defendant, are brought up by critical authors to oppose the
introduction of neuroimaging in the forensic context (66, 115).
To claim that neuroimaging as a whole is useless or dangerous,
by citing selected sporadic cases of misuse of neuroimaging
findings, is a logical bias. Indeed, neuroscientists agree that
in the Weinstein case brain imaging results were improperly
interpreted, as there were neither behavioral symptoms nor
anatomo-clinical correlations nor any causal link. In other
words, in the Weinstein case all the rules for the correct use
of brain imaging in court proposed by recent guidelines (15)
were violated.
In many cases, however, brain scans have provided an
instrumental contribution to support insanity (89) and to
disentangle problematic clinical diagnoses (14). For instance,
in the famous case of Hinckley, who shot President Reagan
(United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1324, 1982), brain
computerized tomography scans revealed enlarged ventricles,
thus supporting the diagnosis of schizophrenia rather than
personality disorder, which were the two diagnoses sustained by
the experts working for the two adversarial sides, respectively.
To conclude, overall it appears that the criticisms raised
against the adoption of neuro-scientific methods, in particular
neuroimaging, in the forensic process are based on erroneous
assumptions and mis-representations of the role of neuroscience
methods in court. In line with previously published analyses
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(15), here we explained why these criticisms are scientifically
ungrounded and are affected by logical/cognitive fallacies.
HOW NEUROSCIENCE CAN IMPROVE
INSANITY EVALUATION
In criminal trials, the judge and juror decisions should be made
in accordance with the “beyond any reasonable doubt” principle.
In the first section (“The intrinsic unreliability of clinical
assessment of mental disorders and insanity”) we have discussed
the reasons why a psychiatric diagnosis based merely on the
clinical observation is intrinsically prone to errors. Some criminal
field experts propose to couple unstructured clinical interviews
with results from neuro-scientific evaluations as a strategy to
overcome this critical aspect, improving reliability in insanity
evaluations and reducing controversies. In the second section
(“Criticisms to the neuro-scientific approach”), we presented the
major criticisms to the introduction of neuroscience in court and
we explained why they do not provide any scientifically valid
basis to reject the utilization of the neuro-scientific approach
as a whole in the field of forensic psychiatry. In this last
section, we will discuss how the neuro-scientific approach can
be usefully implemented to improve insanity evaluations. It is,
however, of the utmost importance to specify in advance what
neuroscientists do not claim, in order to avoid any risk for further
misinterpretation of these opinions.
What Neuroscientists Do Not Claim
Neuro-Scientific Methods Aim to Change the
Rationale Underlying the Determination of Criminal
Liability
Neuroscientists do not claim that the institution of criminal
responsibility should be revolutionized. The determination of
responsibility and insanity is and shall remain based on the
assessment of behavioral symptoms in the particular legal context
the defendant is evaluated (15, 22).
Science Is Devoid of Errors
Neuroscientists are aware that the scientific reasoning is
falsificationist; thus, their modus operandi is to try to falsify their
own hypotheses. Furthermore, neuroscientists are aware that all
human beings are prone to both errors and cognitive biases and
therefore they study how to recognize and minimize these issues
(40, 46, 47).
Neuroscience Alone Is Enough
Neuroscientists are not claiming that neuro-scientific methods
(including in particular neuroimaging) should be used in
isolation, independently from clinical evaluations. On the
contrary, recent guidelines emphasize that neuroimaging
findings should always be coupled with clinical findings (15).
Indeed, when neuroimaging is used in the absence of clinical
symptoms, cognitive fallacies emerge in the interpretation of
the results.
What Is the Usefulness of the Introduction
of Neuro-Scientific Methods in Criminal
Trials?
As already discussed above, neuroscience does not intend
to introduce a “brain-based” concept of insanity. Rather,
neuroscientists wish to contribute to develop a scientific way to
evaluate insanity with the ultimate aim to reduce controversies
and errors in criminal trials, due to both the intrinsic unreliability
of insanity assessments and the unconscious proneness to logical
bias common to all human beings. How does neuroscience
pursue this aim?
Implementing a Rigorous Scientific Logic in Insanity
Assessment Procedures
According to the scientific logic, which is adopted by both
medicine and law, the data used to create a hypothesis
cannot be used also to also confirm or disprove the same
hypothesis. By strictly adopting scientific logic within the
insanity assessment procedure, expert consultants should first
formulate their diagnostic hypothesis by using unstructured
interviews and then they should validate their hypothesis by
using complementary methods: analysis of clinical history,
neuropsychological tests, psycho-pathological tests, laboratory
examinations. This is exactly what physicians do when they
examine a patient: search for independent and objective data to
confirm (or disprove) their diagnostic suspect.
Looking for Converging Pieces of Evidence
As clinical pieces of evidence, based on patients self-report
only, suffer from low inter-rater reliability and are therefore
questionable (31–33), a diagnostic hypothesis should be
corroborated by findings coming from independent, possibly
trans-disciplinary, sources (16). For instance, a clinical diagnosis
can be supported by psychopathological data coming from
self-reported questionnaire that are less prone to malingering,
including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2
(MMPI-2) (116).
Decrease the Potential Impact of Cognitive Biases on
Decisions
The presence of independent but converging pieces of evidence,
obtained using a trans-disciplinary approach, will help to
mitigate the influence of cognitive biases (14, 42, 44–46, 50), as
this approach would make it much more difficult to adopt logical
fallacies to rule out multiple and consistent pieces of evidence
(16, 17, 117).
Neuroscientists are aware that science is not free from
limitations and errors; indeed, progress stems from this
fundamental awareness. Results from psychopathological,
neuropsychological and neuroimaging exams may turn out
to be fallacious as much as psychiatric interviews. However,
in a context where decisions should be reached “beyond any
reasonable doubt,” the 53% the error rate of unstructured
psychiatric interview (31, 33) does not appear to be acceptable.
Then, it is certainly preferable to base any insanity decision
on converging pieces of evidence, each of them obtained
by methodologies that, though potentially prone to errors
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 8 February 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 597918
Scarpazza et al. Translating Neuroscience Into Insanity Evaluation
themselves, all provide coherent results leading to the same
conclusion. In sum, we suggest that unstructured interviews
should be considered the necessary but not sufficient starting
step for the insanity assessment: it is pivotal to formulate a
diagnostic hypothesis that should then be corroborated by a
multidisciplinary assessment.
Thus, the neuro-scientific multimodal and trans-disciplinary
approach aims to minimize the risk of cognitive biases and
to decrease controversies by using a scientific falsificationist
logic and by following the convergence of evidence principle, in
order to improve the overall reliability of the insanity evaluation
process. The final goal is to make the decision on insanity
less questionable, to reduce the duration of criminal trials and
to increase the likelihood for every defendant to receive a
fair punishment. In many instances, individuals may benefit
more from a medical treatment measure rather than from
an exclusively retributive punishment involving incarceration
without treatment. Thus, ensuring a fair and unbiased insanity
evaluation is not only a juridical need, but also a medical and
ethical requirement.
DISCUSSION
The necessity to improve the inter-rater reliability in the
procedures adopted to answer juridical questions is a timely
topic. The neuro-scientific approach, having a multimodal and
trans-disciplinary nature, can help to find a fair solution to
cases which may be particularly prone to judicial error, as it
occurs with insanity evaluations. Criminal systems, jurors and
judges should not neglect the relevant drawbacks of the classical
approach to insanity assessment based merely on unstructured
interviews. This insanity assessment procedure is intrinsically
biased by the low inter-rater reliability of psychiatric diagnoses
(32) and by the presence of cognitive biases in psychiatric
consultants (40, 47). While certain ethical aspects also are
involved (118), the neuro-scientific approach offers a strategy to
mitigate these problems, as it adopts methods with significantly
lower error rates than the classical assessment. Thus results
from unstructured clinical interviews should be integrated with
data from standardized and objective neuropsychological and
psychopathological tests (31, 33) and from laboratory exams
(9, 22, 119) and interpreted in respect of the convergence of
evidence principle (14, 120).
Strategies to improve the reliability of insanity evaluations
should be encouraged within the forensic and legal systems.
Perital questions to the consultants should be formulated in
ways that are less prone to subjective interpretations. For
instance, consultants could be asked to use methods that are
characterized by a lower risk of bias. This may be a critical step to
enhance diagnostic accuracy, which is a fundamental component
in insanity assessments. Consultants also may be required to
provide the psychometric indices (i.e., validity and inter-rater
reliability) of the methods and instruments they intend to use
for the insanity evaluation, that is, unstructured interviews,
structured interviews, questionnaires, psychopathological and
neuropsychological tests. This would help judges and jurors
to evaluate the relative contribution of each technique/test to
the insanity judgment. Finally, consultants should be asked to
provide converging evidence in support of their conclusions from
all the methodologies they used. This would greatly contribute
to decrease the diagnostic uncertainty and the probability to
commit errors.
Psychiatric consultants are advocated to pay attention to
the methodologies they rely upon. They should be aware of
the strengths and limitations of each method they adopt. This
awareness should be considered a strength, as this will allow
the identification of new strategies to solve the problem, as for
instance by adopting the convergence of evidence approach.
A policy of problem denial inhibits the improvement of
evaluation processing and discourages the critical evaluation of
actions. Consequently, a setting where problems are regarded
as an incentive for improvement is required (40). Second,
the reasons why a certain psychiatric diagnosis is formulated
should be clearly stated. In other words, as the DSM-5 provides
specific diagnostic criteria for each diagnosis, the criteria that
are present or absent in the defendant should be clearly
stated. This would favor the scientific debate in court and
would prevent discussions about ungrounded diagnoses. Third,
consultants should never neglect the functional analysis of the
crime; that is, they should explain how a given psychiatric
diagnosis is causally linked to the criminal behavior. Fourth, the
consultant conclusions on insanity should be logically sustained
to enhance transparency.
Attorneys and lawyers can promote the scientific basis of
criminal trials as well. First, they can ask their consultants
to identify the potential presence of logical fallacies in the
thesis of the opposite consultants. This will enable them to
inform the judges on the presence of cognitive biases and,
eventually, will open the door for appeal. Second, attorneys
should prepare the opponent’s cross-examination focusing also
on themethodological aspects: validity, reliability, accuracy of the
methods they have applied. Too general answers as “everyone uses
this method” or “I have done in this way for decades” should not
be accepted, as they are apodictic and unscientific. This would
help to improve the scientific nature of insanity evaluations and
to reduce their still high error rate.
In conclusion, neuroscience does not intend to replace the
classical approach to the insanity assessment procedure, but
rather aims to make it more reliable, less prone to cognitive
biases so to reduce uncertainty and controversies. What is not
clear is why this process, which has been welcomed by all the
other medical braches (e.g., neurology welcomed the advent
of MRI to support the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s and multiple
sclerosis), is still considered worrisome in forensic psychiatry.
Indeed, the major limitation to the introduction of a neuro-
scientific approach into the legal settings does not come from
the judges and jurors, but from scientists themselves who, in
accordance with the denial cognitive bias (40, 48), prefer to
maintain a disputable methodology rather than to improve
the overall procedure by adopting a multidisciplinary approach
based on the convergence of evidence principle. This problem
appears to be specific for forensic psychiatry, while it is not
present in clinical psychiatry, as demonstrated by the constant
growing of studies that search for potential ways to enhance
translational application of neuro-scientific findings into clinical
psychiatric settings (53, 110, 119, 121–124).
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